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With the normalization of relations with the United States and other 
countries, Cuba is ushering in a new era with unprecedented opportunities 
in a globalized world. Participating in the world economy, however, is a 
risky proposition. It requires policymakers to carefully weigh the pros 
and cons of each development path and choose the one that best suits 
Cuba. It also requires policymakers to be prepared for the perils, both 
economic and legal, that may arise from Cuba’s participation in the world 
economy.  
This Article explores Cuba’s new role in the world economy and the 
perils that accompany this new role. The article examines three 
development models that have been utilized by other developing 
countries: import substitution, export-oriented growth, and domestic 
market-oriented growth. It argues that Cuba’s best development path is 
likely a combination of the three, with different focuses in different stages 
of development. The article then analyzes the perils of Cuba’s greater role 
in the world economy. It focuses on three such perils: challenges posed 
by Cuba’s protection of foreign investment through investor-state dispute 
settlements, World Trade Organization (WTO) rules’ constraints on 
Cuba’s use of domestic support measures, and foreign trade barriers that 
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may be erected against Cuban exports by its trading partners. Cuba will 
be better off if policymakers could anticipate such perils and devise 
policy responses accordingly.  
I. CUBA’S CURRENT ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Unlike other former socialist countries that were isolated from the rest 
of the international community before their transition to market 
economies, Cuba has maintained an extensive network of international 
commercial relationships through today. Cuba was a founding member 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and is a member 
of the GATT’s successor organization, the WTO. Since 1975, Cuba has 
been a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
a specialized agency of the United Nations created in 1967 to promote 
intellectual property protection throughout the world. In 2000, Cuba 
joined the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP), an 
organization aimed at facilitating trade and cooperation between its 
member countries and the European Union. Cuba is also a member of the 
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and the Bolivian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), both of which promote 
the economic integration of Latin America through trade and investment. 
Finally, Cuba is a party to sixty bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with 
a wide array of countries, including Western countries such as the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and Italy.1  
Although Cuba has maintained extensive international commercial 
ties, it has not fully taken advantage of the commercial opportunities 
afforded by those ties. As indicated in Figure 1, prior to the late 1980s, 
Cuba’s foreign trade as a percentage of GDP hovered around 76%, in 
large part due to its trade with the Soviet bloc of countries. In the wake 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s trade-to-GDP ratio 
plummeted to about 30% in the early 1990s and recovered gradually to 
about 45% in recent years.2 Although Cuba’s current trade-to-GDP ratio 
is not particularly low in comparison with other countries in the region 
(e.g., Brazil and Argentina), this apparently stable number masks the lack 
of diversity in Cuba’s foreign trade sectors. Cuba’s exports, for example, 
are primarily exports of agricultural products and natural resources or 
                                                                                                                     
 1.  International Investment Agreements Navigator, IIAs by Economy, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad. 
org/IIA/CountryBits/52 [https://perma.cc/GD9F-67GM].  
 2.  Data for these statistics and for Figure 1 are from WORLD BANK, World Development 
Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators [https://perma. 
cc/YX4C-96Z7]. 
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services such as tourism and medical services.3 Cuba also relies heavily 
on imports of essential goods such as oil, foods, machinery and 
equipment, and chemicals.4 Cuba’s “[m]erchandise exports, reported at 
$4.6 billion in 2010, were less than 10% of national output, reflecting the 
low international competitiveness of much of Cuba’s industry and 
agriculture.”5  
 
Cuba’s lack of participation in the world economy can also be seen in 
the small number of WTO dispute settlement proceedings in which Cuba 
took part. Despite being a founding member of both the GATT and the 
WTO, as of July 2017, Cuba has been a complainant in only one WTO 
dispute settlement proceeding and has never been a respondent in a WTO 
                                                                                                                     
 3.  GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & BARBARA KOTSCHWAR, ECONOMIC NORMALIZATION WITH 
CUBA: A ROADMAP FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS Table 1.1 (2014). 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  RICHARD E. FEINBERG, THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY: WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT? 8 (2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/cuba-economy-



























































































































Figure 1. Trade as Percentage of GDP
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dispute settlement proceedings.6 This contrasts with the experience of 
other major developing countries, which, as shown in Figure 2 below, 
have played an active role in litigating trade disputes before the WTO. In 
particular, China, which did not become a WTO member until 2001, has 
already initiated seventeen WTO dispute settlement proceedings and has 




II. EXPLORING CUBA’S NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban government 
explored new ways to participate in the world economy. Cuba’s first step 
was to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1992, Cuba amended its 
constitution to allow private property ownership and the transfer of state-
owned property to joint ventures with foreign investors.8 In 1995, Cuba 
enacted the Foreign Investment Act, which, among other things, allowed 
foreign investment in all economic sectors except defense, health care, 
and education, gave foreign investors the ability to own businesses in 
Cuba, and guaranteed transfer of capital and compensation for 
                                                                                                                     
 6.  WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DISPUTES BY MEMBER, https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm [https://perma.cc/PAG7-RZFT] [hereinafter DISPUTES 
BY MEMBER].  
 7.  Id.  
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expropriations.9 In 2014, Cuba renewed its efforts to attract FDI by 
passing a new foreign investment law that provided tax incentives to 
foreign investors investing in joint ventures in Cuba.10 
Cuba’s current FDI plan, however, is far from being an integral part 
of a comprehensive roadmap for reinvigorating its economy. Instead, the 
plan heavily focuses on addressing the short-term needs of the Cuban 
economy. The Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment, which 
the Cuban government publishes every year to indicate the number and 
types of business projects in Cuba open to foreign investment, clearly 
demonstrates this limited focus. In the 2015 Portfolio, for example, the 
Cuban government listed the number of foreign investment projects 
available in each of the major economic sectors as follows: 
 
Table 1. Business Opportunities by Sector 
(Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment 2015)11 
 













 Total 326 
 
While the above list covers a diverse set of sectors, it demonstrates 
that the government’s priorities lay in tourism (94 projects, representing 
approximately 29% of the total projects), oil (86 projects, 26%), and agro-
food (40 projects, 12%). The government’s reasons for these priorities 
                                                                                                                     
 9.  Mireya Navarro, Cuba Passes Law to Attract Greater Foreign Investment, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 7, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/07/world/cuba-passes-law-to-attract-greater-
foreign-investment.html [https://perma.cc/SVM3-SS8Z].  
 10.  Daniel Trotta, Cuba Approves Law Aimed at Attracting Foreign Investment, REUTERS 
(Mar. 29, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-investment-idUSBREA2S 
0EJ20140329 [https://perma.cc/QUT9-UUZJ].  
 11.  MINISTRY OF INDUS., INV. & COOPERATION DIRECTION, Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities 
for Foreign Investment 2015, at 18–19, http://havana.be.mfa.gov.tr/images/localCache/12/ 
56712fb7-7b3c-4f0e-b597-e9f48e51d64c.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TZL-4RNM].  
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are obvious: given Cuba’s traditional strength in tourism, that sector 
offers an immediate source of hard-currency earnings. And investments 
in the oil and agro-food sectors will reduce Cuba’s dependence on 
imports of those essential products.  
Beyond these priority sectors, however, Cuban policymakers do not 
appear to have reached a consensus on the country’s development path. 
As an example, look at Cuba’s industrial sector, specifically within 
Cuba’s Special Economic Development Zone of Mariel. As shown in 
Table 2 below, of the nine projects specifically identified for Mariel, five 
are being developed solely to replace imports, three will serve both the 
domestic and export markets, and only one covers just the domestic 
market. This fairly balanced list gives no hints as to the focus of Cuba’s 
economic development strategy, if there is any.  
 
Table 2. FDI Projects in ZED Mariel 
(Cuba Portfolio of Opportunities for Foreign Investment 2015)12 
 
Manufacturing Project Amount Purpose 
Radial tires $223 million Domestic market and 
export 
Aluminum cans $40 million Replace imports 
Air conditioning equip-
ment 
$15 million Replace imports 
Light automobiles To be negoti-
ated 
Domestic market and 
export 





Glass bottles for bever-
ages 
$70 million Replace imports 
Various lines of 
glassware 






Domestic market and 
export 
Expendable materials for 
medical use 
$5 million Domestic market 
 
The lack of a clear development strategy at the outset of major 
economic changes is understandable. But as Cuba’s economic reforms 
deepen, Cuban policymakers must have a clear vision of the country’s 
role in the world economy and channel the country’s collective efforts 
accordingly. Toward that end, Cuba should consult the development 
                                                                                                                     
 12.  Id. at 24–28. 
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models adopted by other major developing countries. Below, this article 
briefly discusses three development models that have been utilized by 
developing countries in Latin America and Asia: import substitution, 
export-oriented growth, and domestic market-oriented growth.  
A. Import Substitution  
Import substitution is a development model closely associated with 
Latin America. Also known as “Latin American structuralism,” this 
development model advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic 
production.13 Most countries in Latin America adopted it from the 1930s 
to the late 1980s, with some initial successes.14 Between 1950 and 1980, 
Latin America’s industrial output increased six-fold, well ahead of the 
continent’s population growth.15 Mexico and Brazil were particularly 
successful with this development model. By the early 1960s, domestic 
production supplied 95% of Mexico’s and 98% of Brazil’s consumer 
goods.16 Between 1960 and 1979, Mexico and Brazil collectively 
increased their share of Latin America’s industrial output from 50% to 
over 60% and attracted over 70% of the continent’s FDI over the same 
period.17 By 1981, Brazil produced a third of Latin America’s GDP and 
became the seventh-largest industrial producer in the world.18 
The import substitution model, however, is not without problems. 
First, although import substitution could successfully reduce or end 
imports of certain goods, it merely replaces dependence on those goods 
with dependence on imported capital goods, such as the heavy machinery 
used to manufacture the import-substituting goods. To keep the prices of 
imported capital goods low, the currency of the country that implements 
the import substitution strategy often will be artificially overvalued, 
which leads to slumping exports and ballooning trade deficits.  
Second, although industrialization induced by import substitution 
requires substantial capital, it cannot generate the number of new jobs 
needed to absorb unemployed workers. This results in a two-tiered labor 
force, where one tier is employed in the new, modern industrial sector 
and the other tier is either unemployed or underemployed elsewhere. 
Income inequality often occurs as a side effect of this two-tier labor force, 
ultimately resulting in insufficient demand for the products of the new 
                                                                                                                     
 13.  See generally Kenneth P. Jameson, Latin American Structuralism: A Methodological 
Perspective (Helen Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 43, 1985), https://kellogg.nd. 
edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/043.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWN9-4RKY]. 
 14.  Id. at 5. 
 15.  DUNCAN GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE RISE AND CRISIS OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN 
LATIN AMERICA 15 (2003).  
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
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industries.  
Finally, import substitution shields domestic firms from foreign 
competition and results in inefficient, oligopolistic industrial structures. 
As a result, the domestic industry tends to become dominated by a few 
privileged companies with close nexus to the state, and consumers 
become saddled with expensive, low-quality products supplied by those 
privileged, domestic companies.  
The import substitution problems outlined above eventually led to 
economic stagnation, inflation, and currency devaluations in Latin 
America. In 1982, Latin America’s love affair with import substitution 
came to an abrupt end when Mexico’s debt crisis erupted, causing Mexico 
to default on its debt payments to international investors.  
B. Export-Oriented Growth  
Unlike Latin America, developing countries in East Asia moved away 
from import substitution in the 1950s and turned to export-oriented 
growth. The so-called “Asian Tigers” of Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and 
Hong Kong spearheaded this development model, which was then 
adopted by Thailand, Malaysia, and more recently, China and Indonesia. 
In essence, this development model manufactures and exports labor-
intensive goods by combining low-cost labor from the rural sector with 
imported intermediate inputs and capital goods. Some Latin American 
countries, after the failures of the import substitution model, also turned 
to export-oriented growth. Mexico serves as a notable example, when, in 
the early 1990s, it undertook a series of economic liberalization reforms 
and pushed to become a member of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  
Export-oriented growth played an important role in the economic 
successes of East Asian economies, particularly China. But its drawbacks 
are obvious, too. First and foremost, export-oriented growth leads to 
undue dependence on external markets. Such dependence is not a major 
problem when external demand is steady, but may hurt the export 
industries when external markets go into a long-term decline, as was the 
case in the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.  
Second, export-oriented growth, without more, does not create 
conditions conducive to the upgrading of industries. When the surplus 
labor supply that sustains the export sector dries up, labor costs will 
inevitably rise, eliminating the main advantage of the export-oriented 
industries.  
Third, when coupled with aggressive liberalization of the financial 
sector, export-oriented growth could create fertile conditions for financial 
crises. When used in pursuit of profits, foreign capital is highly 
susceptible to changes in costs of labor and capital. Such changes often 
8
Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 29 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 13
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol29/iss1/13
2017] EXPLORING CUBA’S NEW ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: PATHS AND PERILS 271 
 
spawn large-scale capital flows across national borders, which result in 
financial instability. Indeed, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis may have 
been a direct outcome of this export-oriented growth model.  
C. Domestic Market-Oriented Growth  
A third development model used by developing countries is that of 
India. Unlike the import substitution model or the export-oriented growth 
model, both of which rely heavily on the foreign market, the India model 
utilizes “a combination of growing domestic market demand and 
investment in knowledge-intensive industry and services.”19 The India 
model also relies heavily on domestic capital and homegrown 
entrepreneurs.20 These internal mechanisms, therefore, better insulate 
India’s economy from tumults in global markets. As a result, India’s 
economy is arguably more stable than other export-focused economies, 
with domestic consumption accounting for over 60% of India’s GDP, a 
level approaching that of a fully developed economy.21  
D. Cuba’s Best Development Path 
Given Cuba’s economic conditions, Cuba’s best development path is 
likely a combination of the three development models discussed above, 
with different focuses in different stages of development. At the outset of 
economic reforms, a dose of import substitution may be necessary to 
alleviate shortage in industrial supplies. This is essentially what Cuba is 
partly doing in its current efforts to attract FDI to its industrial sectors. 
Cuban policymakers should be aware, however, that import substitution 
does not provide a long-term solution to the economic problems facing 
the country. Cuba’s small domestic market makes it unlikely that the 
import-substituting firms would operate on an economic scale that would 
justify the large capital investment in those firms, and the limited number 
of such import substituting firms will almost inevitably lead to low 
productive efficiency. Cuban policymakers should also keep a watchful 
eye on worsening income inequality during the implementation of the 
import substitution strategy. 
At a certain point, Cuba’s economic policy should transition from 
import substitution to export-oriented growth. Cuba’s current economic 
plan already focuses on export in certain sectors, notably tourism, natural 
resources, and agriculture. With the exception of tourism, however, such 
exports are concentrated in primary commodities and will not be 
                                                                                                                     
 19.  See Daniel Park, The Growth Debate: India & China, https://www.b2binternational. 
com/publications/growth-china-india-research/ [https://perma.cc/PPL4-2CV6]. 
 20.  GARY GEREFFI, NEW OFFSHORING OF JOBS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (2005).  
 21.  Park, supra note 19. 
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sufficient to drive Cuba’s future economic growth. Over the long term, 
the prices of primary commodities tend to decline relative to the prices of 
manufactured goods, causing the terms of trade of the commodity-
exporting countries to deteriorate.22 At some point in the future, therefore, 
Cuba needs to broaden its export base to include more manufacturing 
industries. This will require Cuba to take initiatives to both build the 
infrastructure for manufacturing and prepare its labor force for 
manufacturing jobs. Cuba may also need to seek greater access to export 
markets through bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements.  
As Cuba goes down the path of export-oriented growth, however, it 
must be mindful of the limitations of that growth model and should 
prepare, at the earliest time possible, to upgrade its industries from low-
end manufacturing to high-end manufacturing and knowledge-intensive 
service industries. Cuba should heed the lessons of China, where the 
wealth generated from the country’s manufacturing boom was funneled 
into real estate and other asset bubbles, rather than into the expansion of 
the country’s innovative capacities. In this respect, Cuba should emulate 
India by fostering homegrown innovation and entrepreneurship. Cuba’s 
ultimate goal should be to transition into a diverse, broad-based economy 
that does not overly rely on the export sector or on any particular industry 
or industries.  
III. PERILS OF CUBA’S NEW ROLE  
As Cuban policymakers explore ways for Cuba to participate in the 
world economy, they need to be aware of the perils of such participation. 
Below, this article will discuss three particular perils that Cuba may 
encounter in its efforts to streamline its economy: challenges posed by 
Cuba’s protection of foreign investment through investor-state dispute 
settlements, WTO rules’ constraints on Cuba’s use of domestic support 
measures, and foreign trade barriers that may be erected against Cuban 
exports by its trading partners.  
A. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Protecting foreign investment is a crucial component of any economic 
strategy that prioritizes the attraction of foreign investment. Cuba’s FDI 
plan is no exception. As mentioned earlier, Cuba’s 1995 Foreign 
Investment Act guaranteed compensation for expropriation of foreign 
                                                                                                                     
 22.  This is known as the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis in economics.  See David I. Harvey 
et al., The Prebisch–Singer Hypothesis: Four Centuries of Evidence, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 367, 
367 (2010).  
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investment.23 The BITs Cuba has signed also offer this protection. The 
BIT between Cuba and Spain, for example, provides that 
“[n]ationalization, expropriation or any other measure having similar 
characteristics or effects that might be taken by the authorities of one 
Contracting Party against investments in its territory by investors of the 
other Contracting Party should be imposed only in the public interest and 
in accordance with the law, and should in no case be discriminatory.”24 It 
further provides that “[t]he Contracting Party that imposes such measures 
shall pay the investor or the investor’s assignees appropriate 
compensation without undue delay and in freely convertible and 
transferable currency.”25 Other provisions of the Cuba-Spain BIT impose 
requirements commonly found in international investment treaties, 
including fair and equitable treatment, most-favored-nation, and national 
treatment requirements.26  
Not only does Cuba provide for protection of foreign investors 
through domestic law and bilateral investment treaties, such protection is 
also actionable through investor-state dispute settlement proceedings. A 
foreign investor from a country that has signed a BIT with Cuba can bring 
an investor-state arbitration proceeding against the Cuban government 
before an arbitral tribunal specified in the BIT. The Cuba-Spain BIT, for 
example, authorizes such arbitral proceedings before (1) tribunals in 
Cuba; (2) ad hoc arbitral tribunals “established in accordance with the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law;” or (3) the International Chamber of Commerce arbitral 
tribunal in Paris.27  
Such investor-state arbitration proceedings represent a major peril for 
Cuba. As Cuba tackles difficult economic problems down the road, it may 
have to take measures that will frustrate the expectations of foreign 
investors, who could then challenge those measures as expropriation or 
violations of the fair and equitable treatment requirement. Such 
challenges decrease the policy space a developing country like Cuba 
would need in order to handle economic emergencies.  
Argentina’s experience with investor-state arbitration proceedings 
provides a good example of the perils that would face Cuba. In 1994, 
Argentina ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, which confers 
jurisdiction over investor-state disputes on the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank agency 
                                                                                                                     
 23.  Supra Part I. 
 24.  Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Cuba-Spain, 
art. V, ¶ 1, May 27, 1994, 1902 U.N.T.S. 305.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. art. IV.  
 27.  Id. art. XI, ¶ 2.  
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established to handle such disputes.28 Since then, foreign investors have 
initiated forty-three arbitration proceedings against Argentina before the 
ICSID, claiming $65 billion in total damages.29 Overall, the ICSID has 
“awarded claimants over $400 million.”30  
A large number of the ICSID proceedings against Argentina stem 
from the emergency economic measures Argentina put in place during its 
1998–2002 financial crisis. During the 1990s, Argentina privatized many 
public services firms and put them in the hands of foreign investors. To 
attract foreign investment, Argentina indexed public services fees to U.S. 
dollars and authorized adjustments to those fees based on the U.S. 
consumer price index.31 This indexation had to be scrapped during the 
1998–2002 financial crisis; Argentina also abandoned its fixed exchange 
rate policy.32 Foreign investors lodged thirty-three claims against 
Argentina before the ICSID, challenging these emergency economic 
measures as expropriations of foreign investment because they upset 
investors’ expectations under the original investment contracts.33  
The ICSID has been rather inconsistent as to the extent to which a 
sovereign government will be allowed to undertake emergency economic 
measures without being held liable to foreign investors. In two ICSID 
arbitration proceedings, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina and 
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, the ICSID arbitral tribunals 
found that Argentina’s actions in response to the financial crisis fell under 
Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, which exempts a state party from 
liability when its actions are necessary to preserve the public order.34 
However, in another arbitration proceeding, Sempra Energy 
International v. Argentina, the ICSID arbitral tribunal reached the 
opposite conclusion, holding that Argentina’s emergency actions did not 
qualify for the necessity exemption under Article XI of the U.S.—
Argentina BIT.35 More importantly, the ICSID tribunal in Sempra Energy 
                                                                                                                     
 28.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, ICSID Convention, art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 80 Stat. 344.   
 29.  Oscar Lopez, Smart Move: Argentina to Leave the ICSID, 1 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
ONLINE 120, 122, http://cornellilj.org/smart-move-argentina-to-leave-the-icsid/ [https://perma. 
cc/N5XN-9ZK9].    
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Diego Petrecolla & Martin Lousteau, Foreign Direct Investment in Argentina During 
the 1990s, 2 LATIN AM. BUS. REV., no. 1/2, 2001, at 38–39. 
 32.  Sebastian Edwards, The Great Exchange Rate Debate After Argentina, 13 N. AM. J. 
ECON. & FIN. 237, 239 (2002). 
 33.  E.g., LG&E Energy Corp. et al. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Award 
(July 25, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C208/DC 
786_En.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6JS-Y7GB]. 
 34.  Id. ¶¶ 1–2; Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 
173–74 (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LZ55-VXFB].   
 35.  Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 388 
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International held that whether a state action falls under the necessity 
exemption under Article XI cannot be determined by examining whether 
the state undertaking the action did so in good faith, but will also be 
subject to substantive judicial review.36  
Although a party to sixty BITs, Cuba has not ratified the ICSID 
Convention and has chosen other arbitral tribunals, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce, as the venues of settling investor-
state disputes.37 This allows Cuba to avoid the ICSID, which has been 
perceived as one of the most hostile arbitral tribunals towards developing 
countries.38 But as long as Cuba participates in investor-state dispute 
settlements in some form, there will be a tangible risk that these 
settlements will compromise Cuba’s sovereign policy space. Cuban 
policymakers should not ignore this risk.  
B. Domestic Support Measures 
Besides the risk of being challenged in investor-state dispute 
settlement proceedings, Cuba also faces risks of being found in violation 
of WTO rules if it attempts to support its domestic industries through 
subsidies or other favorable policies. Cuba has never been challenged 
before the World Trade Organization,39 but that merely results from 
Cuba’s lack of meaningful participation in world trade. As Cuba deepens 
its interactions with international markets, Cuba’s domestic policy tools, 
particularly those related to the protection of its domestic industries, will 
likely be subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
WTO rules have many constraints on a member country’s use of 
policy measures aimed at supporting its domestic industries. The GATT 
forbids contracting states from protecting domestic production by 
applying internal taxes and charges and laws, regulations or requirements 
affecting the internal sale or distribution of products to imported or 
domestic products.40 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) also contains this “national treatment” requirement.41 
Particularly, TRIMs singles out local content requirements (i.e., 
requirements that firms purchase or use products of domestic origin, as 
                                                                                                                     
(Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_ 
En.pdf [https://perma.cc/85YJ-FEHE].  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-413, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
U.S. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA 3-22 (2001). 
 38.  Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID Denunciation and Proposals 
for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. L. 239, 271 (2012). 
 39.  DISPUTES BY MEMBER, supra note 6. 
 40.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3.  
 41.  Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186.  
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violating the national treatment requirement).42 The Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) provides even 
more extensive constraints on domestic support measures. The SCM 
Agreement limits the use of countervailable subsidies, defined as a 
“financial contribution by a government or any public body” that are 
specific to an industry or a group of industries and confer a benefit on the 
industry or industries.43 
The kinds of domestic support measures that could be subject to WTO 
challenges are wide-ranging, as demonstrated by China’s experience with 
such challenges, summarized in Table 3 below. During the fifteen years 
China has been a WTO member, it has been challenged on numerous 
policies related to the protection of its domestic industries, including 
preferential tariffs, taxes, grants and loans, and restrictions on or 
discriminations against foreign firms. To the extent that Cuban 
policymakers are considering similar policies, it will be important for 
them to anticipate the possible WTO challenges. 
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 42.  Id. annex ¶ 1.  
 43.  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14. 
 44.  DISPUTES BY MEMBER, supra note 6, click Disputes by Respondent.  
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C. Foreign Trade Barriers 
Yet another peril Cuba faces in its participation in the world economy 
are foreign trade barriers erected by its trading partners. In the WTO era, 
because tariffs cannot exceed their bound levels, the most persistent trade 
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barriers are those based on non-tariff measures. Two common non-tariff 
trade barriers are antidumping and countervailing duties, special duties 
assessed on certain imports that constitute unfair trade practices and cause 
injury or threat of injury to the domestic industries of the importing 
country. When Cuban exports become subject to antidumping and 
countervailing duties, such duties will likely be high because of the 
extensive intervention by the state in the Cuban economy. WTO rules 
allow the calculation of antidumping duties using a non-market economy 
methodology, which uses the higher product prices from third countries 
(“surrogate values”) as the normal value to which Cuban export prices 
will be compared.45 In addition, in calculating the amount of 
countervailing duties, WTO member countries may use price benchmarks 
from third countries if they believe the in-country prices in Cuba have 
been distorted by government intervention.46 Countries have used these 
special antidumping and countervailing methodologies to limit the export 
potential of China,47 and will likely be used against Cuba if Cuba’s 
exports reach a scale sufficient to threaten the manufacturing industries 
of other countries.  
Some other non-tariff trade barriers may take the form of 
environmental laws, product safety standards, or labeling laws that have 
a disproportionately adverse impact on trade. WTO member countries 
may maintain such barriers if they meet the requirements of the general 
exceptions under Article XX of the GATT.48 In addition, the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures49 and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade50 both permit such barriers and 
allow WTO member countries to impose restrictive measures on imports 
for the sake of protecting legitimate regulatory interests. Indeed, the only 
WTO dispute settlement proceeding Cuba has initiated thus far 
challenged what it argued was a non-tariff trade barrier, the plain 
packaging requirement Australia imposed for tobacco products.51  
                                                                                                                     
 45.  Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 
2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. 
 46.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. VI, 1867 U.N.T.S. 
187 [hereinafter GATT].  
 47.  See Wentong Zheng, Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China, 34 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 109, 124 (2016).  
 48.  GATT, supra note 46, art. XX.  
 49.  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 2 ¶ 4, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
 50.  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, annex 1A, art. 2.5, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.  
 51.  See Request for Consultations by Cuba, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS458/1 (May 7, 2013).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
While starting to leave economic isolation, Cuba still faces a long road 
to an open, prosperous economy. A successful economic strategy for 
Cuba requires Cuba to find its rightful place in the global economy. 
Drawing from the experience of other developing countries, this article 
explained Cuba’s options for participating in the world economy as well 
as the perils associated with the options. Cuban policymakers should 
weigh the pros and cons of each option as they map out Cuba’s future 
development path.  
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